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AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY O' TEE PLACE OF LAW IN OUR CIVILIZATION.
By Kenneth Redden. Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1946.
Pp. 272. $4.50.
Although its title suggests an essay, this book is in fact a collection of cases
and other materials. As such, it presents unusual problems to a reviewer.
Normally, a collection of legal materials deals with a determinate and de-
fined field. The reviewer is concerned with the question of how broadly,
deeply, and stimulatingly the selected materials cover the field for teaching
purposes. Here, an almost limitless field is evoked by the title: not merely
the threshold problem of defining the "law," but also the relation between
law and other social institutions, as well as its links to philosophy, religion,
morals, ethics, economics, and other social sciences. The Table of Contents
suggests an attempt to deal with this enormous area. Thus, Chapter II, What
is Law?, embraces, in forty pages, the following subdivisions: (a) Defini-
tions of Law (three pages of quoted definitions-forty-seven of them-alpha-
betically from Amos to Suarez, taking in Gilbert and Sullivan along with
Aristotle and Aquinas); (b) Law and Justice (represented by Betts v.
Brady 1); (c) Law and viorality (by Hurley v. Eddingfield 2 --doctors are
not legally obligated to tend the sick); (d) Law and Business (by Tuttle
v. Buck '-one may not by price-cutting ruin the business of another just
for spite); (e) Law and Language (by an opinion of Federal Trade Com-
missioner Mason demonstrating that legal opinions can be written colloquial-
ly); (f) Law and the Social Sciences (by Simpson and Field's article of
that title) ; (g) Law and Science (by an article describing the hesitancy of
the courts to recognize the probative force of blood-grouping tests); and
(h) Law and History (by a brief description of the feudal system of land-
holding in England). But the editor probably did not consider these complex
topics adequately disposed of, even for a survey that is introductory.
A more definite guide to the editor's intention is furnished in the Preface.
He states that he conceived the purpose of the book to be "the means whereby
the college student may see the 'law'. . . . as a fluid set of working
principles responsive to the fluctuating needs of society." 4 He hopes that
the background material presented "will enable the student to understand
the vital task of the law, as well as the techniques of the lawyer," 5 and that
such understanding will correct the sad fact that "too many intelligent people
now regard lawyers as shysters and the law as a vicious witchcraft." 6
Consideration of the book in the light of these announced objectives is
complicated by the fact that the editor deliberately sought "to include stimu-
1316 U. S. 455, 62 Sup.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942).
2156 Ind. 416, 59 N. 1,. 1058 (1901).
3 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909).
4P. V.
5 Pp. v-vL
6P. v.
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lating material provocative of class discussion." The reader must try to
determine just how far the materials are intended to instruct by authorita-
tive pronouncement and how far by provocative error. There is no clear
sign here that the latter is relied upon. Presumably, then, the views ex-
pressed in the materials are regarded by the editor as at least tenable and
worth serious consideration on their merits, even if not precisely reflecting
his personal views. With this assumption, the reviewer will consider the
probable impact of the materials upon students having no previous learning
in the law, and how well that impact achieves the avowed purposes.
Reference has already been made to the very rapid survey in Chapter II
of the relations between law and a variety of other matters. Briefly, the
scheme of the rest of the book is as follows: Chapter I, The Need for Law,
contains Dean Green's statement of his philosophy of law.8 The crux of
that statement is the proposition that "law is the power of an organized
political society brought to bear through the judgment of officials, on mat-
ters subject to government control, as a result of following the processes
provided by government." But since such law is only one phase of the
total social organism, a satisfying philosophy of law must "be found in a
philosophy of the total social organism . . ., 9 This chapter also has
a newspaper editorial urging that lawyers are more likely candidates for the
bench than non-lawyers, and a Florida opinion stressing the lawyer's posi-
tive role in the administration of justice as a prelude to a judgment of dis-
barment against a lawyer who dealt loosely with his client's funds.
Chapter III, The History and Function of Law, contains the profound
and difficult first chapter from Holmes' The Common Law, a sprightly and
informative article describing the historical development of equity jurisdic-
tion, and a recent article by Dean Pound lambasting administrative agen-
cies.
Chapter IV, The Growth and Elasticity of Law, includes a description of
the Piepowder Courts, a case (Daily v. Parker) 10 which frankly makes
new law in holding that children have a cause of action against a siren who
lured away their father, and West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish," under
the topic "Economic Change."
Chapter V, Theory of Legal Liability, after a brief series of extracts on
criminal liability, sets forth a group of five cases, including Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad,12 Jacob and Young., Inc. v. Kent,13 and Rayner v. Pres-
ton, 4 to illustrate private civil liability, and Esquire, Inc. v. Walker,15 along
with two other cases to illustrate public civil liability.
Chapter VI, Extent of Relief and Type of Protection, presents opinions
dealing briefly with damages, mandamus, injunction, and the declaratory
judgment.
' P. vi.
8 As set forth in My PuILosoPny or LAw 131-140 (1941).
9P. 3.
10 152 F.2d 174 (C.O.A. 7th 1945).
11300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937).
12 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
13 230 N. Y. 239, 129 N. D. 889 (1921). The "s" is dropped In the title of this case
in the present volume.
14 18 Oh. D. 1 (1881).
15151 F.2d 49 (App.D.C.1945).
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Chapter VII, Stare Decisis, after a brief speech by Judge Otis on the
abiding, fundamental concepts of law and justice, gives the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis 16 and the opinions
of Judge Parker 17 and Justice Jackson -8 in the Barnette case.
Chapter VIII, Judicial Legislation, presents Delany v. Moraitis,19 holding
that "country" in a deportation statute must be construed not to mean a geo-
graphical area, in order to effectuate the purposes of the act and avoid ab-
surd consequences, and Carolene Products Company v. United States,
2 0
holding that a statute cannot be construed to hold a defendant outside its am-
bit merely to avoid a seemingly harsh and inequitable result.
Chapter IX, Judicial Relationships, includes Williams v. North Caro-
lina2 ' and one other case to show judicial relationships among the several
states, and Catlette v. United States,2 2 sustaining the conviction under the
Civil Rights Acts of a deputy sheriff who after removing his badge par-
ticipated in an assault in his office on some Jehovah's Witnesses, to show
judicial relationships between the states and the Federal Government.
Chapter X, Judicial Organization and Procedure, is a brief description of
the courts of New York State and their procedure from summons to execu-
tion and appeal.
Chapter XI, The Actual Practice of the Law, contains a lucid description
of the various ways in which lawyers pursue their vocation, the Canons of
Ethics of the American Bar Association, and a typical form of oath of ad-
mission.
Chapter XII, Human Rights and the Law, includes a speech by Justice
Dore of New York on natural law as contrasted with the exercise of power
on the basis of uncontrolled personal will, extracts from the Charter of the
United Nations, and .A'foore v. Sutton,? holding that a law requiring pho-
tographers to be licensed violated the provision of the Virginia Constitution
protecting the "liberty" of the citizen, the court finding itself "donstrained
to emphasize the virtue of a firm adherence to the philosophy that that state
is governed best which is governed least."
One might quarrel with the editor about the classification of some of the
material. Current usage perhaps associates the phrase "judicial legislation"
more frequently with the activity of the courts in dealing with common-law
materials than with problems of statutory construction, as it is used by
Professor Redden. Prosecutions under the Civil Rights Acts may not
strike one as the most pertinent illustration of judicial relationships between
the states and the federal government. Williams v. North Carfolina appears
to be a rather difficult vehicle for showing college students legal relations
among the states. And neither the flag-salute cases nor the West Coast Ho-
16 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940).
17 Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 47 F.Supp. 251 (S.D.W.Va.
1942).
Is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 Sup.Ct.
1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943).
19 136 F.2d 129 (O.O.A. 4th 1943).
20 140 F.2d 61 (C.O.A. 4th 1944).
21325 U.S. 226, 65 Sup.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945).
22 132 F.2d 902 (C.C.A. 4th 1943).
23 185 Va. 481, 39 S. 1. 348 (1946).
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tel case appears to be a very typical example of the operation of the prin-
ciple of stare decisis. On this last point, however, it should be noted that
Daily v. Parker, placed elsewhere in the book, could be referred to for
additional light on that topic. Finally, it seems rather sketchy and one-
sided to present the topic of administrative law solely by a diatribe of Dean
Pound's.
These points, except the last, are minor. The important question is how
well the materials as a whole serve the broad purposes of the book. It
strikes this reviewer that the outstanding impression a student is likely to
carry away is a sense of the amount of freedom enjoyed by the appellate
judge in the decision of cases. Daily v. Parker, the Palsgraf and Jacob and
Youngs cases, the cases invoking and applying contradictory canons of
statutory interpretation, and the flag-salute cases would certainly disabuse
any student of the notionthat the judicial process is an exercise in pure logi-
cal reasoning-that known principles of law exclusively appropriate to the
particular case are applied with logical rigor to decide that case. This no-
tion about the judicial process has for a long time been under fire as more
or less of a pretense? 4 Certainly since the appearance of Judge Cardozo's
lectures on the nature of the judicial process and related topics, the pretense
has not been whole-heartedly maintained within the profession. And one
may hazard a doubt that businessmen who enjoyed day-to-day legal assist-
ance in a variety of matters ever took it very seriously. But it was the pic-
ture presented to the public at large, and it is hard to gainsay the propriety
of letting the educated public in on the true nature of the process. In ac-
complishing this, the book makes a worth-while contribution to general ed-
ucation.
But once the pretense is gone, once judges are exposed as deciding cases
on the basis of judgment-not merely on the basis of logically verifiable rea-
soning from fixed rules of law-there arises inescapably the very difficult
problem of determining just what should limit their freedom and just how
their judgment is to be made responsible. What standards are to govern
their exercise of judgment? Certainly this is one of the crucial questions
for jurisprudence today. Bound up with it are all the philosophical problems
about pure law and values. The frequently heard call for coordination of
the social sciences seems to have major significance for this problem.
Whether or not the law is slow in adopting blood-grouping tests, or other
tools from the psychologists and physiologists, in resolving disputes of fact
is far less important than whether or not the law is to accept aid in shaping
objectives in those areas of human conduct in which the other social sciences
purport to offer scientific, or at least disciplined, guidance and knowledge.
Here ends and means get considerably mixed up. A whole-hearted accept-
ance of aid from other social sciences means that judges cannot insulate
themselves from scrutiny and criticism in the judgment process. The prob-
lem has been sharply defined by Dean Pound's suggestion that judges are
controlled by the "received ideals" of the legal order in which they function.
And he has rightly insisted upon the importance for jurisprudence of an
24 See JEROME FnAw', LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1936); Levi, An Introiuotion
to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. oF C. L. REV. 501 (1948).
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intensive study of our received ideals in order to reduce to authoritative
form an important part of the considerations which in fact guide judges.25
Neither in content nor in organization does the present volume point up
or suggest approaches for dealing with this basic problem confronting law-
yers and jurists. There is included Simpson and Field's excellent article on
"Law and the Social Sciences," 26 developing the theme that the problem is
threefold: "The integration of social knowledge, the determination of social
ends in the light of that knowledge, and utilization of the law as one of the
major means to those ends." But the article is buried in the comprehensive
second chapter, which disposes lightly of so many aspects of the relation of
law to everything else. And the organization of the volume seems to point
to a different solution of this problem. Thus, the concluding chapter, en-
titled Human Rights and the Law, begins with a speech by Justice Dore con-
trasting Antigone's noble challenge to Creon with the demand of a capricious
Roman wife, in a satire of Juvenal, that her husband crucify a slave because
she wills it: sit pro ratione voluntas. Justice Dore then asserts that the
idea of law based on will and force is the "dominant characteristic of
modem ideas of law"; that analytical, historical, sociological, and pragmatic
jurisprudence "All essentially deny objective norms of right and wrong and
substitute norms determined by the dominant group, those who have the
power to act. . . in essence all such dogma denies law as reason
and extols it as will." 27 Here, plainly, is an invocation of natural law. In
the same key is the speech by Judge Otis introducing Chapter VII, which
discusses the Immutable Principles which lie "above, and beyond, and be-
neath, and around those lesser rules of law with which generally we are em-
ployed." 28 This natural-law approach is reinforced by the last item in the
volume, the Virginia case, already mentioned, which holds unconstitutional
an act requiring photographers to be licensed, essentially on the immutable
principle that "that state is best governed which is least governed." 29
The implications of this repeated theme seem clear enough: law must be
administered according to principles of natural law to which the legal pro-
fession alone has the key. This hardly seems to achieve the editor's pro-
fessed intention to- present the law "as a fluid set of working principles re-
sponsive to the fluctuating needs of society" and to provide a basis for an
integration of the learned professions. Rather it tends to go far in the di-
rection of putting judicial law-making back into a shadowland of mystery;
to make of judges the priests of an occult science which permits them, and
them alone, to draw from the noble but vague concepts of natural law the
formulae for deciding cases and establishing rules for the decision of fu-
ture cases to make of law something which is beyond the grasp of intelli-
gent people and which they may well regard as a "vicious witchcraft."
It is certainly a distortion of recent developments in jurisprudence to im-
ply, as the present volume apparently does, that to reject the traditional con-
cepts of natural law is to banish ethics, morality, and every kind of ideal
25 Pound, Tle Ideau Element in Americamn, Judiola Decision, 45 HARv. L. REV. 136
(1932).
26 32 VA. L. REv. 855 (1946).
27 p. 261.
28 p. 172.
29 P. 270.
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standard from law and the judical process. That there is something seriously
wrong with Justice Dore's analysis is evident simply from the fact that he
includes sociological jurisprudence in his catalogue of modern theories which
exalt sheer will and power. Dean Pound has long been prominently iden-
tified with the sociological school of jurisprudence. To accuse him of aban-
doning the ideal of the rule'of law is, of course, absurd.
It is true that the views stated by some of the realists in recent decades can
be erected into a system which would recognize as law only that which the
dominant political force in the society wills. 30 For example, some of Judge
Jerome Frank's earlier writing has been attacked on this basis. Yet it is per-
fectly clear from his later writing that he does insist upon the importance
of ideals by which law in any social structure is to be measured.31 Similarly,
Morris Cohen could readily be regarded, on the basis of some of his writing,
as hostile to traditional notions of natural law; yet no one believed more de-
voutly than he that ethical ideals are real and should be invoked to assay
the administration of justice.32 On the other hand, Professor Fuller, one
of the most thoughtful American defenders of natural law, uses the term in
a non-traditional sense, specifically repudiating any doctrine of natural and
immutable rights.3 3 The truth seems to be that law is such a Protean insti-
tution that writers, even when discussing it in general terms, tend to reflect in
their generalizations that aspect of law which has most concerned them.
Their generalizations thus become vulnerable to generalizations springing
from, and therefore shaped by, another aspect of law. These problems are
far from simple, and it is pretty nearly impossible to approach them without
stepping into philosophical quicksands. Yet they are approached, however
unwittingly, whenever immutable concepts of natural law are invoked.
It is hard to see how a dogged clinging to those concepts can lead to any-
thing but continued obfuscation of the judicial process. Except where it
has a specific theological basis-and for most persons who use it, it does not
-natural law is far too vague a set of principles to provide, alone, control-
ling standards by which judicial performance and the whole system of ad-
ministering justice may be exposed to effective scrutiny and criticism by the
society it serves. It is a fair index of the essential vagueness and ambiguity
of "natural law" as a description of ultimate standards that it has appeared
in history, by turns, as a basis for reactionary and for revolutionary move-
ments. Dean Pound has gone so far as to suggest the necessity for distin-
guishing between "natural natural law"-"an ideal derived by reason inde-
pendent of the positive law of a time and place"--and "positive natural law"
-- "an ideal version of the legal and social institutions, and legal precepts of
the time and place." -'
One might reasonably expect, therefore, that a volume for laymen which
lays bare the fact that judicial conduct is not absolutely controlled by strict-
30 Cf. Laski, Morris Cohes'8 Approack to Legal PkilosophV, 15 U. or Cma. L. Rv.
575, 584 (1948).
31 See JEROME FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM (1945).
32 See particularly his article, Philosophy and Legal Scienwe, 32 CoL. L. REV. 1103
(1932), reprinted in LAW AND TE SocIAL ORDER 219 (1933). See also Laski, supra
note 30, at 584.
33 FuLLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 99-100 (1940). Frank criticizes Fuller's
use of the phrase. FATE AND FREEDOM 296 (1945).
34 Pound, Book Review, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 724, 731 (1948).
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ly legal rules should at least present a more balanced view of the efforts that
have been made in recent decades to make more scientific, or at least more
rational, the non-legal factors which enter into the functioning of our legal
institutions. It does considerably less than justice to the current state of
jurisprudence to create the impression that every departure from natural
law is a reversion to oriental despotism.
There are additional omissions which may appropriately be noted in
view of the sweeping title of the present volume. The average educated
layman may be expected to be interested in other aspects of the law than the
way in which judges decide the legal issues involved in a case. While the
influence of substantive rules of law upon the layman is most pervasive, the
law really hits him sharply when he is a party to a legal controversy. Most
laymen are not likely to have many such contacts. But partly just because
of their infrequency, and partly because so much is likely to be at stake
when they occur, the impression made is enduring. No litigant today is
likely to experience the bewildered frustration which Mr. Crogate is
reported to have experienced when Baron Surrebutter attempted to ex-
plain why it was just that he should have lost his case to vindicate the ele-
gant rules of special pleading.3 5 Under our continuing reform of pro-
cedure, it is rare that a litigant is denied what we call a chance to be heard on
the merits. But what about the character of the hearing when it does take
place? The layman, expecting to find an impartial, searching inquiry into
the truth, is much more likely than not to come away with the impression that
he has witnessed an incomprehensible verbal and histrionic battle between
skilled champions. It is hard enough under the best circumstances so to con-
duct a trial that the defeated litigant does not feel sour about the whole
process. Prom this point of view, at least, the trial of a lawsuit appears to
preserve far too many of the attributes of a trial by battle.36 And this comes,
of course, on top of the irritation flowing from the apparently inescapable
blight of judicial administration-the enormous time involved in bringing a
lawsuit to its conclusion.
In addition, there is the problem of making the machinery for the ad-
ministration of justice available to the vast numbers who are unable to af-
ford the going fees for legal services. 37 Certainly those who feel directly
the impact of the law only as a debt-collecting agency, who are unable to
obtain legal assistance when they are the defendants, and who are unable
35 9 HoLDSWOTH, HISTOnY oF BONGLISH LAw 417 (1926).
36 Professor Morgan's analysis of the narrow, if not amoral, approach of lawyers
to the technique of trying cases is still valid. Book Review, 49 HA v. L. REV. 1387
(1936). Occasionally, rather wistful protestations of a different sort are heard:
"While a court room is not a laboratory for the scientific pursuit of truth . . i
[it) is not a game of blind man's buff . . . Federal judges are not referees at
prizefights but functionaries of justice." Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 68 Sup.Ct. 391, 92 L.Ed. 360 (1948).
37 REGINALD HEBERI S-aTH, LEGAL SERVICE OriCESrx For PERsoNs OF MODERATE
IEAN S (1947). Ir. Smith estimates that the class of "persons of moderate means,"
unable to pay for adequate legal service under the present system, includes at least
one-third of all our citizens. In part, the problem is one of court organization pro-
viding machinery for the prompt and inexpensive disposition of relatively small
claims. See Pou-D, THE SPIRIT OF Commox LAw 132-135 (1921). But except
for the very smallest cases a lawyer's services are likely to be necessary even where
there are efficient tribunals.
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to make use of the law when they have claims to press or controversies to
settle, are not likely to regard lawyers and the law with a kindly eye. Nor is
a thoughtful layman likely to remain untroubled by this problem, even though
he is financially able to secure competent legal assistance when he needs it.
That these factors are significant for an appraisal of the place of law in our
civilization, and for the attitudes of laymen toward lawyers, would seem to
be recognized by the statement in the first case printed in the present volume:
"The administration of justice . . . contemplates the righteous settle-
ment of every controversy that arises affecting the life, liberty, or property of
the individual. Lawyers and judges are stewards of the law provided for
this purpose." s8 It can hardly be said, however, that either of them is ade-
quately dealt with by a brief discussion of each of the principal forms which
judicial relief takes, by a brief description of the structure of the courts and
their process, and by the reprinting of the Canons of Ethics. That the bar
has recognized its obligation to make legal service more generally available
is attested by recent bar-association activities.39  Similarly, the reform in
procedure over the past few decades has been notable. Something of that
great effort ought to be communicable to laymen without undue involvement
in the intricacies of procedure.
Less easy to deal with is the problen presented by the traditional technique
of party presentation of controversies. Basically, the problem rests on the
impoitance of factual disputes in most litigation. 40 And the layman perhaps
could be made to see what lawyers appear now to be ready to accept: that
the resolution of a factual controversy is not a simple pursuit of "truth."
If the complexity of the problem can be shown, sufficient justification can
perhaps be effectively shown for preserving, within limits, the principle of
party presentation despite its tendency to run to extremes.
A volume of this character might well have taken cognizance of the ob-
servation often made that lawyers as a class, and to some extent the entire
machinery for administering justice, represent primarily the interests of
the dominant economic interests of the community, and therefore tend to
block, and often succeed in blocking, the efforts of the community to secure
the legal recognition of new interests or the adequate protection of interests
already recognized. De Tocqueville gave classic expression to this phenome-
non in its broadest terms:
I do not, then, assert that all members of the legal profession are at
all times the friends of order and the opponents of innovation, but mere-
ly that most of them are usually so. In a community in which lawyers
are allowed to occupy without opposition that high station which nat-
urally belongs to them, their general spirit will be eminently conserva-
tive and antidemocratic. . .. . Whenever an aristocracy consents
to impart some of its privileges to these same individuals, the two classes
coalesce very readily and assume, as it were, family interests.41
38p. 7.
39 These activities are reviewed by SmTHu, op. cit. supra note 37.
40 Sudge Frank has lately been insisting upon the importance of fact-finding In
the administration of justice and decrying its neglect. See, for example, Frank,
Words and Music, 47 COL. L. REv. 1259, 1272-78 (1947). It has been suggested that
the nature of the judicial process also requires party presentation of questions pri-
marily legal. Levi, supra note 24, at 504.
411 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274-275 (1946).
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It is hardly necessary to add that de Tocqueville was not hostile to lawyers,
but regarded their conservative influence as essential to the maintenance of a
stable democracy. The problem arises not because the bar exerts a moderat-
ing influence on the legal acceptance of new interests, but because it tends
often, as a result of its extensive identification with a particular economic
group, to resist all change. History affords ample evidence that the problem
is a real one: Thus, outstanding service was given by American lawyers to
the cause of the Revolution. But the standing of the profession as a whole
was more influenced by the fact that most of the leading members of the
bar were Royalists."
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the judicial machinery
was seriously frustrating the recognition of interests which, it is perfectly
clear now, were legitimately pressing for recognition. Dean Pound de-
scribed the process as one by which the courts enforced "their ideas of eco-
nomics upon reluctant communities in passing upon the constitutionality
of social legislation." 43 A recent study has traced in detail how leaders of
the bar articulated the legal principles by which the United States Supreme
Court invalidated legislation restrictive of the interests of corporate indus-
try.4 The history of labor injunctions prior to the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act 45 and the formidable opposition of leading members of the
bar to the National Labor Relations Act 46 are frequently cited as instances
of the same phenomenon. Justice Stone, not so many years ago, condemned
in the sharpest terms the alliance between lawyers and corporate interests as
he fouhd it in the 1920's:
At its best the changed system has brought to the command of the
business -world loyalty and superb proficiency and technical skill.. At
its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier day the ob-
sequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and manners
of the market place in its most antisocial manifestations.
47
Perhaps an additional illustration may be found in more recent issues
of some moment. When the rapid growth of administrative agencies in
the 1930's brought the principal holders of economic power into considerable
conflict with government, the American Bar Association embarked upon
a long and vigorous campaign to regularize the administrative process in or-
der to minimize the danger of hardship from arbitrary and irresponsible con-
42 CHARLES WARR , HISTORY OF THE A. i CAN BAR 212 (1912).
43 POUj'mD, THE SPIRIT OF THE ColmoN LAw 106 (1921). It should be noted that
Dean Pound attributes this result almost entirely to a combination of the common-
law judicial tradition and the complex of ideas and ideals absorbed by those trained
in the tradition of the nineteenth century. But cf. PoUND, INTERPRETATIoNs op LE-
GAL HISTORY 114 (1923), recognizing at least some significance in "the origin, educa-
tion, and every-day associations of the judges."
44 BmNwAnmm R. Twiss, LAWYEnS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942).
45 See FELIx RANFURTER A.D NATHANz GREENE, THE LABOR INxrUcTIoN (1930).
46 For some of the controversy engendered by the American Liberty League and
its Lawyers' Committee, see N. Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1936, § 4, p. 12, eol. 6; id. Mar.
28, 1936, p. 14, col. 4; .*ic. April 10, 1936, p. 14, col. 1; id. April 15, 1936, p. 7, Col. 1;
d. April 21, 1936, P. 7, col. 1; id. May 28, 1936, p. 2, col. 2; id. June 26, 1936, p. 2,
col. 2; id. April 21, 1937, p. 10, col. 3.
47 Stone, The ,Public Inyfluece of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 1 (1934), quoted in
ESTHER LUCILE BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 221 (1938). Miss
Brown's book discusses various aspects of the administration of justice and the
role of the bar.
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duct by public officials. The campaign culminated in the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.48 Of late, a committee of the House
of Representatives has been conducting an investigatory program which has
frequently visited grave hardship upon exponents of social and economic
views not shared by the business community. A fairly persuasive case has
been made to the effect that the procedure of the committee has not always
conformed to the highest standards of fairness.4 0  The organized bar has
been conspicuously unmoved by these apparent instances of governmental
abuse. 50 Indeed, when the inquisition of a group of Hollywood writers
(who lost their jobs as a result of it) raised a considerable furor in the
press, the American Bar Association Journal took note of the problem only
to deplore the tendency of the newspapers to make the technical error of
regarding the hearings as if they were trials and condemning them because
they so plainly lacked the basic features of a fair trial as we know it.51 The
contrast does not seem to be without significance.
These observations are no doubt somewhat controversial. They may well
reflect a point-of view not shared by the editor of the present volume.
Even if that is so, the point of view would seem to be sufficiently widespread
and persistent to warrant attention in such a volume. And the issue is close-
ly related to the problem, previously discussed, of making more articulate
and objective the non-legal factors in judicial decision. For an uncritical
reliance on vague natural-law concepts provides a framework for judges who
consciously or unconsciously desire to resolve the social factors in decision
by reference to an idealized picture of the status quo: Dean Pound's "posi-
tive natural law."
It may be that to include any of these additional topics would require an
unreasonable expansion of the size of the book. Yet the range of problems
dealt with could have been considerably broadened without undue increase
in length by greater reliance on extracts from books and articles and less
reliance on cases. A few cases might well be appropriate to illustrate the
judicial technique at work. It may be doubted, however, whether so exten-
sive a use of cases is particularly helpful where the purpose is to furnish
ideas and information rather than to provide exercise in the technique of
handling case material.
JAcon D. HYMAN.
University of Buffalo.
48 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.O.A. § 1001 et seq. (Supp.1947).
49 See Gellhorn, Report on a Report of tize House Committee on Uu-Anerican
Activities, 60 HArtv.LREv. 1193 (1947).
50 The question of the responsibility of the bar has'been raised by John Lord
O'Brian in his thoughtful address, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, reprinted
in 61 HA.v.L.REv. 592, 610 (1948), 71 REP.N.Y.STATE BAn, Ass'i 157 (19-18).
51 Editorial, A Con gressional Hearing is no'a- "Trial" in "Court," 33 A.B.A.J.
1119 (1947). The Association has apparently adopted the technique of Inferring
guilt by association, one of the aspects of the work of the Thomas Committee which
has been most vigorously assailed. The Board of Governors of the Association
decided not to elect to Association membership known members of the National
Lawyers' Guild. By way of explanation there is offered the following extraordi-
nary statement: "This decision was based upon the action taken by the Thomas
Committee of the House of Representatives on the basis of the evidence gathered
by it, as to the attitude and policies of the National Lawyers' Guild In supporting
what are characterized as Communist-Front activities." The inference drawn Is
that Guild members do not support "the American form of government and law
and individual rights." 34 A.B.A.J. 487 (1948).
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CAsns ox DrCEDENTs' ESTATES. By Max Rheinstein. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947. Pp. viii, 1295. $8.50.
Stating that "the law of decedents' estates constitutes a set of institutions
which are all designed to achieve one purpose, viz., that of making possible
the orderly transfer of wealth from generation to generation," the author
further tells us in his Preface that "when seen in that light, the law of de-
cedents' estates appears as a machinery and the whole book has been de-
signed to serve as a blueprint of this machinery, to show how it is planned,
how it functions and particularly how its several parts interact." 1 If blue-
prints suggest to you the draftsman's table, the high stool, the fluorescent
light and the slide rule; plans, not operations; the still picture, not the
motion picture; then I suggest that you ignore the author's figure of speech,
because this book is a dynamic portrayal of law in action.
Divided into nine parts, it opens with a thoughtful essay by the author
on The Social Function of the Law of Inheritance. This six-page essay
constitutes Part 1.
Part 2 contains two highly enlightening and provocative chapters entitled,
respectively, Problems of Legislative Policy and Problems of Legislative
Technique and of Statutory Interpretation. These chapters are made up
largely of textual material skillfully organized to develop the historical
evolution of the modern law of succession in both common-law and civil-
law countries; to encourage a critical evaluation of this law; and to culti-
vate an awareness of the problems of legislative policy, draftsmanship, and
interpretation in this legal area.
Part 3, entitled Wills-Requirements for Effectiveness, deals with formal
requisites, incorporation by reference, non-testamentary act, integration,
revocation, capacity, undue influence, and fraud. It is perhaps significant of
the searching, probing quality of this book that the material on formal req-
uisites opens with an excerpt from Professor Fuller's article in the Colum-
bia Law Review entitled "Consideration and Form." 2
Part 4, somewhat misleadingly entitled The Contents of a Testamentary
Instrument, begins with a four-page textual discussion of the dispositive
clauses in a will. In the course of this discussion the author tells us:
Following the traditional lines of academic, departmentalization,
this book does not deal with the special problems of trusts or future
interests. This chapter and the three following ones will be concerned
primarily with techniques of testamentary disposition and those limita-
tions of a testator's power of testation which are not concerned with
the duration of his scheme of disposition.3
Professor Kales' delightful essay on "The Will of an English Gentleman
of Moderate Fortune," followed by two student law-review notes, one con-
cerning conditions in testamentary trusts as a device of control and the
other on trusts for animals, make up the balance of the first chapter in Part
4. The next chapter concerns limits on freedom of testation and consists
IP. iv.
241 COL.L.REv. 800 (1941).
3 P. 350.
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largely of Professor Scott's valuable article on "Control of Property by
'the Dead," which appeared first in the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
oziew.4 The third and last chapter in Part 4 deals with the protection against
disinheritance afforded the surviving spouse and the descendants.
Part 5, entitled Determination of the Testator's Scheme of Disposition, is
constructed on the premise that "the problem of interpreting ambiguities in a
will, 'correcting' mistakes of a testator or draftsman, explaining words or
phrases typically occurring in wills, and of providing solutions for situations
not foreseen by the testator are interrelated, but differ so from each other
that they should be carefully distinguished." 5
Particularly interesting is the chapter on Rules of Authoritative Explana-
tion, a designation coined by the author to examine what are commonly re-
ferred to by the weasel-words "rules of construction." This chapter contains
an enumeration of "words and phrases to be used with care" c which should
find a conspicuous place on every draftsman's checklist. Indeed, all of Part
5 should be" required reading for the draftsman of wills and trusts. No-
where else, so far as I know, will he find so useful an analysis of problems
that crop up regularly in practice and have been a notorious legal back-
wash of sloppy thinking. Perhaps it is in this part of his book that Profes-
sor Rheinstein has made his most significant contributions, not only to the
classroom, but also to the bench and bar.
Parts 6, 7, and 8 concern probate and the administration of decedents' es-
tates. No student book deals with these important matters more exhaustive-
ly or with greater insight. Particularly useful is the introductory chapter
on The Functions of Probate and Administration, which affords an invalu-
able matrix for the detailed study which follows.
Part 9 bears the somewhat imposing title, Transactions to Influence the
Course of Inheritance or to Eliminate Inheritance. After a brief chapter
on Transactions to Restrain Defeasance of Expectancies comes a chapter on
Anticipation of Inheritance, which deals in orthodox manner with the trans-
fer of expectancies, releases to the ancestor, advancements, and the satisfac-
tion of legacies. The last chapter in the book concerns will substitutes-
the gratuitous promise to be performed after the promisor's death, the deed
to become effective upon the grantor's death, gifts in contemplation of death,
contracts for the payment of benefits to a third party after the death of the
promisee, 'the creation of joint interests, a single case on the Totten Trust
problem, and three cases plus an excerpt from the Restatement of Trusts on
inter vivos trusts, doubtless intended to do no more than suggest to the stu-
dent the significance of this device as a will substitute.
No mere survey of the scope and general organization of this book can
do more than suggest its unique values. Every chapter bears testimony
to the author's mature scholarship, breadth of learning, and profound grasp
of his subject. Immeasurably enriched by frequent inclusions of compara-
tive-law materials, this book provides an invaluable frame of reference
for the critical study of the modern American law of decedents' estates.
4 65 U.or PA.L.REv. 527 (1917).
5 P. vii.
6p. 733.
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The notes which follow many of the displayed cases and other readings are
especially rich in citations, quotations, suggestive ideas for the draftsman,
and hypothetical cases which explore the periphery of the problems ex-
amined in the reported cases. Then, too, there are the problem cases, many
of which are suitable for "term papers," all of which are provocative, and
some of which serve as a basis for developing an entire topic covered in the
book by the "problem method," if an instructor so desires.
By frequent use of textual material to supply information and background,
the problems presented in the displayed cases are pointed up and brought in
sharp focus, and at the same time the students' appetite for the subject is not
dulled by a pedestrian development of its minutiae through case analysis
and synthesis. Even more important, perhaps, the textual material is so
skillfully handled as to stimulate imagination and encourage critical evalua-
tion. Also, of course, it saves time, which suggests that the author has adopt-
ed the "study, read, scan" device familiar to all who attended the Command
and General Staff School during the last war. Thus in his Preface Profes-
sor Rheinstein tells us that "only certain parts of the book are meant to be
.'studied'; others are included only for reading; and still others may well
be skipped by the general user and be looked up only by those who are
specially interested in a particular set of problems." 7 Indeed, elsewhere in
his Preface Professor Rheinstein tells us that he "does not regard it as
necessary or even advisable that a course on decedents' estates should cover
everything that is covered in this book." 8 He then enumerates readings
equivalent to about ninety-eight cases which he believes should be studied,
and suggests that an instructor, in the remaining time at his disposal, select
from the wealth of available material the topics he particularly wishes to
emphasize.
I have dwelt at some length on this matter because I suspect some in-
structors at least, while recognizing the merits of this book, will be reluc-
tant to adopt it for class use because of its length. Long it is, but by follow-
ing the author's suggestions, supplemented by a judicious selection of addi-
tional material in the book which explores areas of particular interest to him,
the instructor should be able to "custom-build" the course in terms of his
own interests and the hours available to him.
Professor Rheinstein tells us in his Preface that "if it were not so ex-
tremely unorthodox" he would have liked to entitle his book "How to
Draft a Will" or "How to Draft a Probate Act." 9 I know of no teaching
material better designed than this book to realize the latter objective; but
it is perhaps just as well that Professor Rheinstein did not yield to the first
temptation. Certainly no materials which exclude consideration of what are
traditionally known as future interests and trusts and which do not examine
those aspects of taxation and insurance which must be considered by the
estate planner, can give adequate training in how to draft a will. Indeed,
my one regret over this book is that its author felt compelled (regretfully, I
surmise from the tenor of his explanation) to honor what, to me, is the un-
-wise academic departmentalization which dictated the exclusions I have
7P. tii.
8 P. iv.
9 P.v .
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mentioned. Realistically speaking, the draftsman of all but the simplest
wills is of course concerned with the future interest and the testamentary
trust. Also, the inter vivos trust is one of the most widely used of the will
substitutes. And, of course, it is unthinkable today to prepare a will with-
out regard to the law of taxation. If it be thought that an integration of
materials on wills, future interests, trusts, and the relevant aspects of tax-
ation and insurance would produce too bulky and unwieldly a course, a con-
viction which I do not share, then it seems to me that the desirable break-
down would be accomplished by establishing a separate course on fiduciary
administration, as has been done by Professor Simes. Be all that as it may,
Professor Rheinstein has brilliantly realized the objective he set for himself.
In so doing, he has produced an invaluable source book and a remarkably ef-
fective teaching vehicle. All interested in the field of decedents' estates owe
him a very real debt of gratitude.
Jo N RITcIE, III.
University of Virginia.
MA~uL or LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY. By M. Ray Doubles and Frances
Farmer. Charlottesville: The Michie Casebook Company, 1947.
Pp. xi, 217. $5.50.
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE UsE oF LAw BOOKs. By Arthur S. Beard-
sley and Oscar C. Orman. Second Edition. Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, Inc., 1947. Pp. xii, 653. $6.00.
These two recent volumes devoted to the important subject of law books
and their use illustrate the increasing significance of legal bibliography.
Perhaps it is dealing in clich6s to point out that the library is the lawyers'
laboratory or that legal bibliography concerns itself with the tools of the
profession, but that does not detract from the correctness of such state-
ments. In this day and time, when the lawyer and researcher are con-
fronted with thousands of cases and statutes, both state and federal, with
digests, citators, and looseleaf services, it is becoming axiomatic that the
lawyer, neophyte or seasoned, who is well versed in the use of his materials
finds himself in a superior position.
Although these two works approach the subject from different angles,
the ultimate objective is the same. Both strive to provide the law student
and the lawyer with an acute analysis of the problems which confront him
in the manipulation of the materials of what is probably the most systema-
tized of all sciences. -
The "Manual" by Dean Doubles and Miss Farmer places its main empha-
sis on methods of search. To this end the authors explain in their Preface
that they are not seeking to duplicate the various comprehensive treatments
of the materials of legal bibliography which are extant, but rather are con-
centrating on a clear explanation of the process of research itself. Thus,
various chapters are devoted to the classification of law books, anticipating
the search, law charts, the encyclopedias,. the American Digest System, an-
notated reports, citators, United States statutes and codes, English law books,
and finally topical law reporters.
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As a teaching instrument this volume should be most valuable. It is clear-
ly and simply written, and incorporated within the text itself are many
sample pages of the digests, encyclopedias, citators, and other law books
which are analyzed and illustrated. The problems which appear in a pocket
supplement to the work certainly should not be overlooked. They constitute
a recognition of the fact that the teaching of legal bibliography consists of
two parts: first, the instruction in the use of the books, and second, the
actual use of the books by the students themselves in the working out of as-
signed problems. It does the student little good to hear the instructor ex-
pound the merits or limitations of a particular set of law books if the student
never has the opportunity to handle and work with the books.
The Beardsley and Orman treatise is literally a joy to the legal bibli-
ographer. Here is a comprehensive, all-inclusive treatment of the subject,
which should satisfy even the most discriminating. The work is a second
edition, representing a thorough revision of the first, which appeared ten
years ago. The authors have sought not only to cover completely from
a bibliographic standpoint the standard research materials, but also to deal
with such topics as administrative and departmental decisions, municipal
charters, codes and ordinances, and constitutions, legislation, and treaties.
Part VI, which is devoted to brief-making, should be helpful to both the
student engaged in moot-court work and the lawyer engaged in actual prac-
tice. The authors not only discuss the art of brief-making but more spe-
cifically deal with the preparation of both the trial brief and the brief on ap-
peal.
The appendices which constitute Part VII are also of much value. Ap-
pendix II, which is a checklist of state and territorial reports, provides the
librarian with useful information, as do Appendices III and IV, which deal
with English case reports. Finally, the list of abbreviations contained in Ap-
pendix V will aid all those engaged in legal research.
The assignments and problems which are contained in a separate pamphlet
are a necessary and integral part of the text. The importance of such prob-
lems has already been commented upon, and it is only necessary to add that
those who adopt this book as a teaching tool will find the problems to be of
valuable assistance.
LEONARD OPPENHEEIM.
Tulane University.
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PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT.
Selected Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Real Property.
An Introduction. By Myres Smith McDougal and David Haber.
Charlottesville: The Michie Casebook Corporation, 1948. Pp. viii,
1213. $9.50.
The zeal for reform, or perhaps for something different, leads its advocates
into new terminologies and new arrangements which leave the relation of
the new to the old somewhat obscure. It was thus with the Hohfeldian
terminology. It was thus with the functional approach. It must be so with
the new policy science. In order to make more apparent the relation of
this new venture to the things to which the legal profession are more accus-
tomed, comparison may be made with another new casebook, that of Casner
and Leach.'
McDougal and Haber contains some 1213 pages, Casner and Leach 1001.
The number of principal cases given is almost identical, the greater number
of pages in McDougal and Haber being taken up with text material. The
traditional Rights in the Land of Another and Rights Incident to Ownership
of Land in Casner and Leach occupy 204 pages; as gathered from the in-
dex, in McDougal and Haber these occupy 325 pages. In Casner and Leach,
one chapter of thirty-nine pages is given to Legislation Restricting the Use
of Land and Constitutional Limitations Thereon. In McDougal and Haber,
some 500 pages are given to Public Planning. Thus, all of Part III in
McDougal and Haber, consisting of almost two-thirds of the book, is de-
voted to rights in land and public controls, while the corresponding coverage
in Casner and Leach constitutes one-quarter of the book.
Chapter IV in McDougal and Haber, on Landlord and Tenant (seventy-
five pages), corresponds to Chapter V of Casner and Leach (164 pages);
and Chapter V of McDougal and Haber, on Concurrent Interests (twenty-
six pages), corresponds to Chapter IV of Casner and Leach (forty-two
pages).
Chapter III of McDougal and Haber consists of seventy-nine pages and
is headed "Dead Hand Volition-Trusts, Future Interests and Possessor)
Estates." This is evidently intended as a substitute for the customary histor-
ical introduction to real-property law, for it is said in the Preface that stu-
dents will be advised or required to acquire a good working acquaintance with
such historical introductions as those of Bigelow, Holdsworth, Plucknett,
Philbrick, and others. Plunging right into the middle of things, this substi-
tute introduction is taken up largely with the Rule against Perpetuities, al-
though eighteen pages are devoted to remainders, five pages to the Rule in
Shelley's Case, three pages to possibilities of reverter, nine to rights of en-
try, four to powers of appointment, and six to executory interests. The
Statute of Uses is mentioned once, but not, it would appear from the index,
in this chapter. Quia Emptores and De Donis do not appear in the index.
Casner and Leach's introduction to the land law is much more along tradi-
tional lines.
1 CASNER A-D LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY (Temp. ed. 1947, The Foundation
Press, Inc.).
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Chapter II of McDougal and Haber consists of 129 pages on "How Claims
are Established." Apparently the thought back of this caption is much like
that back of Aigler's "Titles to Real Property Acquired Originally and by
Transfer Inter Vivos." The field is the same but very much reduced in
size. Somewhat similar to this but more like Vendor and Purchaser is Cas-
ner and Leach's Part IV, of 236 pages, on Bona Fide Purchasers of Real
Property.
Part I of McDougal and Haber, consisting of 112 pages, is devoted to
Property and Wealth. There is nothing comparable in Casner and Leach.
Part I and Chapters IX-XI at the end of the book, comprising close to half
its volume, represent the new field that the editors would add to the treat-
ment of property in the law schools. What comes between is largely the old
matter in new guise. This volume leaves Personal Property for a comple-
mentary course. The plan is to use the book in a course of four semester
hours, "though it could be tailored for more or less."
One thing remarkable about this new book is the prominence given to
Rights in Land. If the reviewer is not mistaken, Rights in Land has been
the forgotten property topic in legal education. Now "the stone which the
builders rejected has become the headstone of the corner." On the other
hand, Estates and Trusts have been considered the two outstanding con-
tributions of the English-speaking world to jurisprudence. They are all
but ignored. Perhaps we took an undue pride in Estates and Trusts be-
cause they were our own contribution. Perhaps it would be better if we
threw them aside and adopted the civil law of property, or started de novo and
built up a new system from the beginning. Perhaps so! But we haven't
done either of these things yet and are not likely to do so. In the meantime,
they are the difficult part of property law. They are the part of property law
that the student must master in school if he is ever going to master it. And
without it he is incompetent to advise on a will of any complexity or to pass
on a title of any difficulty.
There are many approaches to the law-policy, realistic, analytic, socio-
logical, philosophic, comparative, historical, and perhaps many others.
Without an approach a lawyer is a mechanic, a mere case lawyer. He is
likely to be a juggler of words, the uninspired utterings of some uninspired
judge. To see him perform, one would judge that the law is primarily a
matter of words, whereas the fault may lie not so much with the law as
with the lawyer. To an extent which, it is to be hoped, does not exist in
other fields of the law, this is true in the law of property. To give an ex-
ample: Illinois is a state of great wealth, where family settlements abound.
Before Kales wrote his book on the subject,2 the decisions bn future inter-
ests in Illinois were a disgrace, but they could be matched from almost any
other jurisdiction. They were a matter of words and not of the realities of
the law. The change in Illinois since Kales wrote his book has been very
great. The law has some meaning. It is not a mere matter of words.
What Kales did in Illinois can be done in every state. But to do that the
writer must have the key that Kales had to the understanding of the com-
mon law of real property. That key is the historical approach. Without
2 ALBERT MARTIn KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS
AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLInois (Callaghan & Co., 1920).
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it the law of real property is a meaningless puzzle, a matter of mere words.
With it one understands and goes ahead to better things, for the historical
approach does not mean a slavery to the past. Maitland had a tremendous
influence on the Law of Property Act of 1925. The English commission-
ers of 1829 were men to whom the law of real property was not a mere mat-
ter of words. They knew it through its historical background, and, having
that knowledge, they could see what was obsolete and could make the most
drastic cuts without endangering the true. The contemporary New York
revisers were perhaps men of equal ability, but they were amateurs in their
knowledge of the real-property law compared with the English commission-
ers. They made a mess of things, while the better things in the Restatement
of Property are largely a reflection of the work of the commissioners. Per-
haps this point has already been labored too long; but if we are to go ahead
with the many undertakings that the editors of this casebook have at heart,
we must make the present law of property something more than a mere mat-
ter of words to our students, and to this end the historical would seem a
necessary approach. With competent understanding they can proceed to
build wisely and well.
PERCY BORDWELL.
State Unizersity of Iowa.
LAwyERS, LAw SCHOOLS, AND THE PUBLIC SEnvicn. By Esther Lucile
Brown. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1948. Pp. 258.
$3.00.
In 1939 the Russell Sage Foundation assigned to Esther Lucile Brown the
task of discovering "to what degree and with what efficiency legtil education
was preparing men and women to serve the interests of government."
M1iss Brown visited twenty-three law schools, "supposedly representative of
the most progressive thought of the period," and spent considerable time
studying the actual functioning of lawyers in the Federal Government in
Washington during the war. This book is Miss Brown's report on her find-
ings.
By way of a setting for the problem, Miss Brown first reviews the role
played by lawyers in public affairs and the recruiting and training methods
of the Federal Government. This is important, but scarcely new, territory.
She then undertakes a description of the work performed by lawyers in the
federal service. The reduction to print of the pervasive influence of law-
yers in the Washington bureaucracy is an illusive and difficult assign-
ment. Miss Brown is only partially successful at it. Certainly the colorless
and highly theoretical descriptions in Civil Service "job descriptions," as the
author recognizes, are of little help. The contributions of agency annual
reports are not much more illuminating. Nevertheless, Miss Brown does
catch some of the reality in her brief account of the relationships between
lawyers and other government technicians and in her description of the man-
ner in which lawyers affect policy decisions. These sections of the book
are a valuable contribution.
Most of the book is devoted to a survey of the response that the law
schools have made, or rather have failed to make, to the increasing need for
training in public affairs. The picture that Miss Brown presents is on the
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whole a most disheartening one. She finds that the law schools have in gen-
eral failed either to grasp the significance of the problem or to take any
coordinated or decisive steps to meet it. Courses essential to training for
modern public life, she finds, "have undergone insufficient alteration or
have been inadequately cultivated." Accomplishment in the use of social-
science materials "has been very unsatisfactory." Teaching methods should
"undergo extensive alteration"; training for research in non-legal materials
has been "negligible"; the necessary job "cannot bd done [even] with double
the budget now available." A scattering of individual law teachers, and
considerably fewer law schools, have been alive to the isstues and have ex-
perimented with solutions. But these achievements have "not yet extended
far beyond introductory efforts."
Undoubtedly these conclusions are essentially correct. Unfortunately the
study does not carry us very far toward a solution.
The study recognizes the general objective clearly enough--"how to teach
the lawyer's role in social planning." And it states the broad requirements of
a program. There must be an abandonment of mere training in "technical
legal doctrine" and, quoting from Professor Osborne, "a synthesis of rele-
vant human experience and knowledge in order to provide adequate guides
for making and carrying out wise policy decisions." Emphasis must be
placed upon this "policy-making" role of the lawyer. In order to make
room in the curriculum for new subject mnatter there is need for a reorgani-
zation and reduction in many of the standard courses. The general approach
should be "functional." Materials from the social sciences must be intro-
duced and integrated with the doctrinal aspects of the law. Traditional
courses, such as real property, should be reoriented to consider important
public problems. New courses, especially in administrative law and legisla-
tion, should be made a significant part of the curriculum. Teaching methods
should be brought up to date, the budget doubled, and an over-all plan de-
vised and adopted.
These are reforms that have been urged by progressive thinkers in legal
education for some time. But the study makes little contribution to the ef-
forts of the advance guard to implement such objectives. It-is valuable as a
description of the various experiments, past and present, which have been
attempted. But there is insufficient critical analysis of these experiments
and no effort at a blueprint for the future. In this the book is disappointing.
Furthermore, some of the basic problems receive little or no attention.
For instance, there is the question of fundamental reforms in the American
civil service system. Most of the modem industrial nations have long util-
ized elaborate and, in some cases, specialized forms of training for govern-
ment service. In the United States we are still operating upon the assump-
tion that public service is a dubious career and that the government should
be manned by temporary amateurs. Aside from the schools of public ad-
ministration, the law schools are the only educational institutions that give
a form of training even remotely related to government administration.
This accounts, incidentally, for at least part of the predominant influence of
lawyers in government service. Should the United States begin to think in
terms of building a modem civil-service system based upon a program of
training for public office? If so, what part should legal education and the
I JouRNAL OF LEGAL ED.No.2-12
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law schools play in such a program? Miss Brown does not address her-
self to this point. Nor does she consider, in discussing the budget problem,
the role that should be played, if any, by federal aid.
Another problem, which Miss Brown deals with to some extent but which
seems to me inadequately treated, is the question of emphasizing the "pub-
lic" aspects of so-called "private law" courses. Regardless of the number
of lawyers entering government service, the overwhelming majority of law
students will undoubtedly continue to engage in private practice. Miss
Brown properly points out that these students will inevitably deal with prob-
lems of public import, either in direct contact with government agencies
or in handling purely private matters as to which the ultimate decision rests
upon factors of a "public" nature. Incidentally, one wishes that, for the
sake of harassed deans, Miss Brown had elaborated the argument that such
students are better trained for success in private law by receiving some initia-
tion into the underlying public considerations. In any event, the major ef-
forts of most law schools will continue to be directed toward the education of
lawyers who will not hold public office.
In addition to this, the legal method courses designed to afford a general
comprehension of law as a social instrument are, in my opinion, of doubtful
value. There is only limited value even in broad survey courses that sweep
over the entire machinery of government bureaucracy, such as adminis-
trative law, or deal with exceedingly broad aspects of government, such as
constitutional law and legislation. What is needed in the law schools, there-
fore, is not only an extension of "public-law" courses but, even more im-
portant, an introduction of the "public" point of view into "private-law"
courses.
This of course calls for a revision of the entire curriculum and a reorien-
tation on the part of the entire faculty. Just how this can be accomplished
in an institution such as the average law school is a baffling question. Nei-
ther law-school deans nor curriculum committees seem to possess that totali-
tarian authority over the prima donnas who make up law-school faculties,
especially those buttressed by permanent tenure, which would be necessary to
effectuate such far-reaching changes in the immediate future.
I think, also, that Miss Brown may underestimate the forces that prevent
abandonment of the narrow doctrinal approach to legal training and obstruct
the development of "policy-directed" methods of law instruction. She
points out that "the belief is widespread and insistent that progress in un-
derstanding and using the social sciences has been retarded, not so much
by the difficulty involved in the educational process, as because the bar has
been oriented primarily toward the world of business and monetary gain
rather than toward intellectual ideas and their use for social engineering.",
Quite so. But the issues cut deeper still. The implications of rejecting
legalistic methods in favor of "social engineering" have perhaps not been
fully realized.
As long as law students are taught in strict terms of legal formulae, the
+eacher need have no particular worry about the underlying political, eco-
nomic, and social assumptions upon which the legal doctrines are based.
I P. 120.
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The very fact that these assumptions are submerged and not examined as-
sures that they will be acceptable to conventional forces of society. But
what happens when the law teacher decides to teach "policy-directed" law?
Obviously this requires that he make some explicit assumptions as to the
basic goals toward which his policy is directed. Lasswell and McDougal
in their pioneering work have already faced this problem. Their goals, or
values, are "the sharing of power, the production and sharing of wealth,
well-being, enlightenment, health and respect." 2
At this point it becomes clear that "policy-directed" law training is likely
to challenge sharply some of the fundamental premises upon which current
society, of which lawyers are the most articulate defenders, now rests. It is
possible for the law teacher partially to avoid the problem by couching his
political, economic, and social premises in exotic language, comprehensible
only to his disciples and a few other cognoscenti. But this is a temporary
expedient. Sooner or later "policy-directed" legal training must face the
board of trustees, the alumni, the American Bar Association, and all the
forces of conventional society. Thus, in the end, the prospect for a success-
ful "policy-directed" legal education may require a political atmosphere more
tolerant than exists at the present day.
TomAs I. EmERsoN.
Yale University.
2 McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Polivy
Science in the WOrld Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1348 (1947). See also Lasswell
and McDougal, Legal Education anz Public Poliey: ProfessiOlial Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 212-26 (1943).
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